What is the extent of relations between Turkey and Somalia?
Turkey’s entry into Somalia in 2011 it began as a humanitarian partnership but soon evolved right into a strategic partnership. Since then, its support has been economic and infrastructural, and increasingly includes the military.
The Turkish government has noticed Somalia’s situation failed statehood and the shortage of other major international stakeholders as a possibility to extend its popularity throughout Africa.
Türkiye aimed to:
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gain international visibility
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test your ability to intervene in conflict and post-conflict situations
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increase market diversification in East Africa
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cultivate its image as a benevolent Muslim middle power by promoting Islamic solidarity.
Several Turkish religious associations and non-governmental organizations already operating in Africa have been established directly involved in development and aid projects. Major national brands equivalent to Turkish Airlinespromoted campaigns to boost funds for Somalia.
Over the course of several years, the federal government portrayed Turkey’s involvement in Somalia as an internal issue.
Turkey’s early efforts to bring Somalia back to the international community’s table have been successful.
With the reopening of Mogadishu’s port and airport 2014, each managed by Turkish firms, the economic situation in Somalia has improved in comparison with the previous decade. Turkish political elites began to portray their involvement in Somalia as: Successful story. This is despite some persistent critical issues, including the failure to root out the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization.
Turkey has taken responsibility for training the Somali National Army in cooperation with other stakeholders, including the European Union and the United States. This opened a military base in Mogadishu in 2017. One of the military’s elite units is trained at the bottom, Gorgor Brigadesand serves as a Turkish military outpost within the region.
Al-Shabaab’s persistence has convinced Turkey that it must provide more lively military support for Somalia’s development. Ankara also wants to guard its economic and political investments in Somalia.
Finally, politics across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are behind Turkey’s agreement with Somalia.
Over the last 12 months, Türkiye has done just that he got here closer to the United States. It positions itself as an efficient ally in Africa that may counteract negative effects French withdrawal – as Russia’s growing influence. Turkey’s involvement in Somalia is driven by its involvement efforts in Libya.
In each cases, Türkiye proved willing to shoulder the safety burden NATO membersespecially Italy, refused to fulfill.
Turkey’s involvement in Somalia is due to this fact a part of a broader foreign policy strategy geared toward gaining greater autonomy in global politics. Increased importance inside NATO would help achieve this.
What is the context of the maritime defense pact between Turkey and Somalia?
Turkey and Somalia began working on an agreement between November 2023 and January 2024. Turkey agreed train and equip Somali naval forces and help patrol the country’s 3,333 km coastline.
The Turkish defense sector has an increasing influence on Ankara’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey sees itself as an exporter of defense products and a partner in training special forces and police. African countries are among the many predominant targets of the Turkish defense sector.
Somalia due to this fact provides the chance to disseminate more Turkish productions and items.
In 2022, Türkiye has turn out to be, together with the United States, a serious supporter of a a brand new offensive against Al-Shabaab. It provided logistical support to the Gorgor forces and air cover for the national army. This cooperation resulted within the signing of a 10-year defense agreement in February 2024, including maritime security.
Turkey and Somalia have been working on an agreement for a while, but recent regional events have undoubtedly influenced the timing of the announcement.
One such development is the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which might be signed in January 2024. Turkey has good relations with Somaliland, but considers Somalia’s territorial integrity to be essential for its stability.
At the identical time, political dynamics within the Horn of Africa are changing. Tension installation between Ethiopia and Somalia have led to the formation of recent coalitions involving regional and extra-regional actors.
It’s vital to not overdo it, but two factions are emerging. On one side are Ethiopia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the opposite side are Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia.
Initially, Türkiye tried to mediate between the factions to defuse tensions.
However, the agreement with Somalia limits Turkey’s room for maneuver. While this appears to don’t have any impact on relations with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, there could also be negative consequences, especially for a lot of Turkish economic interests in Ethiopia.
What is the UAE Ratio?
When it involves the Horn of Africa, the UAE plays a key role. Türkiye and Somalia have relations with the Emirates.
Between 2014 and 2020, Türkiye engaged in bitter rivalry with the Emirates in the broader Red Sea area. This was as a result of the 2 countries’ different visions for the long run of the region.
Relations have improved since 2020 throughout the 2020–2022 Tigray War each Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates supported the Ethiopian government.
However, recent events within the Horn of Africa equivalent to The United Arab Emirates-backed Ethiopia-Somaliland Agreement, threaten to cause latest frictions between Turkey and the Emirates. Türkiye doesn’t have the political will or material capability to take care of this. Over the last three years, the United Arab Emirates has supported the Turkish economy, including: direct investmentchanging the balance of relationships.
An analogous situation is in Somalia.
From a industrial and security perspective, the Emirates are vital in Somalia. United Arab Emirates manages two key Somali ports – Berbera and Bosaso. There are also plans to take over Kismayo. And Emirates was certainly one of the president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud predominant sponsors. Cutting ties with Abu Dhabi could be dangerous for the Somali president.
What happens then?
There remains to be great uncertainty about how one can implement the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU and the Turkey-Somalia defense cooperation agreements. It is obvious that each the United Arab Emirates and Turkey have gotten more lively and influential within the region. And that African dynamics inside and between countries are closely linked to regional and global trends.
