When The Burmese army regained control situation of this country in February 2021, after a ten-year break in democracy, the international community resorted to a well-recognized tool: economic sanctions.
The coup was led by several countries, including the United States AND Member States of the European Unionimpose or reinstate a trade embargo and other financial prohibitions on the Burmese military.
February 1, 2024 – coinciding with the third anniversary of the military coup – US announced a brand new round of sanctions. This comes as Myanmar’s government stays embroiled in a crushing civil war ethnic minority insurgent groups. But to date, sanctions have failed to encourage ruling generals to return to the path of democracy or tip the war in favor of pro-democracy resistance groups.
Moreover, as experts in East and Southeast Asia AND economic sanctionswe all know that Burma’s history – and our own research – suggests that economic sanctions are unlikely to have such an impact in the near future.
Current sanctions against Burma
The current sanctions against Burma have much in common with those imposed before 2010, when the country began the means of restoring democratic rule. Actions taken by the US, EU and others from 2021 – including targeted and sectoral sanctions – aim to undermine the military junta’s ability to brutally suppress the pro-democracy movement in the country.
At the same time, those imposing sanctions seem more aware than in previous periods potentially negative consequences for the Burmese people.
Sanctions imposed after the 2021 coup are more targeted and aim to influence the military government and its corporations. In earlier periods financial resources were wider and affected the entire economy of Burma.
This is by design. Legal basis of US economic sanctions imposed on Burma after 2021, Executive Order 14014underlies a variety of targeted measures that include restrictions on individuals and corporations related to the supply of jet fuel to the Myanmar Air Force.
Signed on February 11, 2023, the latest US sanctions regime reflects changes in the way The Biden administration intends to to impose financial penalties on Burma’s generals, not its people.
The United States also prioritized working with international partners to impose complementary moderately than competitive sanctions.
Evidence of this coordination has emerged December 10, 2021coincides with Human Rights Day, with the United States jointly implementing the package of measures with the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union. For example, the EU’srestrictive measures” – the bloc’s jargon for economic sanctions – includes a lot of the same U.S.-imposed sanctions, reminiscent of restrictions on exports of military and dual-use equipment, asset freezes, visa and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the export of telecommunications equipment.
The United States also imposed targeted sanctions through the so-called List of specially designated residents, a blacklist of individuals with whom U.S. residents and corporations are prohibited from doing business. The entities listed in Myanmar include military commanders, businessmen and their families. The idea is to focus economic problems on the individuals and entities involved in the coup and subsequent repression of pro-democracy activists, moderately than on the country as a complete.
Previous sanctions imposed on Burma
Certainly, history suggests that the United States needed to update its sanctions policy. Myanmar observers have long debated the effectiveness of the old sanctions regime against Burma, including: many summaries that it had little impact on the junta’s decision to return to democracy. Rather democratic elections in Burma were a part of the military plan of motion and never the result of sanction pressure.
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One reason for skepticism about earlier sanctions was that they targeted imports from key sectors of Myanmar’s economy, reminiscent of clothing and textiles, which weren’t affiliated with the junta. These economic sanctions have hurt private businesses in Myanmar.
The latest sanctions attack businesses owned or related to the militaryreminiscent of Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company, Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited, Myanma Gems Enterprise, Myanma Timber Enterprise and Myanmar Pearl Enterprise.
However, post-2021 sanctions still face the same problems as their predecessors.
They lack the weight of the United Nations, which has not called for sanctions on Burma. This contrasts with sanctions imposed on other countries violating international norms, e.g North Korea AND Iran.
The UN Security Council is unlikely to impose sanctions on Myanmar as a everlasting member China and Russia don’t want to condemnnot to mention sanctions, Burma’s military rulers.
As a result, the international community was divided in response to the democratic backsliding in Burma Human rights violations. While Western countries selected to isolate Burma through targeted trade and financial sanctions, East and Southeast Asian countries did so maintained diplomatic and trade relations with the military government.
There can be an incentive for Southeast Asian countries not to participate in any sanctions regime. As we show in our upcoming book: “Trade with pariahs“Myanmar’s trade ties are often the strongest in its region.
During the first sanctions period from 1988 to 2015, Southeast Asia’s economic ties with Myanmar tightened as the country’s trade with Western countries imposing sanctions declined.
For countries in East and Southeast Asia, maintaining ties with Burma provided not only economic opportunities but additionally a method to monitor and maybe improve Burma’s internal situation. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, Burma admitted in 1997 despite the junta’s refusal to allow democratic elections and address human rights violations. The approach favored by Myanmar’s neighbors was to try to bring Myanmar’s generals in from the cold moderately than ostracize them internationally.
And despite Singapore’s recent declaration that it is will stop arms transfers to BurmaASEAN and East Asian member states proceed to refrain from imposing sanctions on Burma, preferring engagement over isolation.
Can sanctions work?
While U.S. sanctions have the potential to harm the military, there’s reason to imagine they will not have the ability to bring the government to its knees. It is probably going that uneven expiration of previous US sanctions has provided US corporations with insufficient time to fully engage and invest in the Myanmar market, currently limiting the potential for future leverage.
AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo
Countries with significant influence are unlikely to impose sanctions on Myanmar. And this undermines US and Western efforts to isolate the country.
Sanctions imposed on the trade in jet fuel may pose a challenge for the West. Amnesty International “Deadly Cargo” in 2023 stressed that Myanmar’s military can proceed to provide a reliable supply of jet fuel despite US sanctions on the product.
The reason is that greater than 95% of Myanmar’s refined crude oil – needed for jet fuel – comes from regional trading partners. From 2021, China, Thailand, Singapore and Russia are to accomplish that provided most of the jet fuel for the Burmese militaryenabling him to proceed bombing the entire country.
Even though it’s a US treasure prolonged its sanctions to jet fuel cover each military and trade issues, the impact of those sector-wide sanctions stays unclear.
While the nature of the current U.S. sanctions is clearly different from previous efforts to pressure Myanmar’s generals, the effectiveness and potential for fulfillment appear quite similar. Given the lack of economic links between Burma and countries outside its region, the potential for change in Burma seems unlikely without significant efforts by those countries that are able to leverage their extensive economic interdependence: China, Japan and ASEAN member states.
ASEAN will not be blind to the erosion of human rights and has signaled its awareness of the regime’s atrocities and support for civilians through preventing Myanmar’s turn to the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026.
However, the regional bloc is unlikely to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in the foreseeable future, raising further doubts about the ability of Western sanctions to significantly improve human rights and democracy.
